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Abstract 
 
In this article, I examine the purpose of public philosophy, challenging the claim that its goal is to create better 
citizens. I define public philosophy narrowly as the act of professional philosophers engaging with non-
professionals, in a non-academic setting, with the specific aim of exploring issues philosophically. The paper 
is divided into three sections. The first contrasts professional and public philosophy with special attention to 
the assessment mechanism in each. The second examines the relationship between public philosophy and 
citizenship, calling into question the effect public philosophy has on political reasoning. The third focuses on 
the practice of public philosophy, describing actual events to investigate the nature and limits of their 
outcomes. I conclude that public philosophy aims at future philosophical inquiry but is best considered a form 
of entertainment. 
     
 
 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
I write this paper from the perspective of a public philosopher who has hosted close to 125 
events over the last six years. As director of The Institute for Philosophy in Public Life and 
the host of the public radio show Why? Philosophical Discussions About Everyday Life, I 
have blogged, lectured, facilitated discussions and film series, and interviewed some of the 
most impressive philosophical minds for audiences ranging from six people to a couple of 
thousand. My personal experiences permeate this paper, although they become most 
relevant in the third section.  
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Public and professional philosophy contrasted 
 
Philosophers don't like the general public; we have a tendency to regard them as the enemy. 
The very first story in the Western philosophical narrative—Thales’s monopolization of the 
olive presses—is one of a philosopher getting revenge.2 It is a self-serving anecdote that 
confirms for many philosophers, their attitude of intellectual superiority, suggesting that 
philosophers could indeed get the upper hand economically, politically, or otherwise, if only 
we cared about worldly goods. But, the story suggests, because philosophers are morally as 
well as intellectually superior, we choose not to take advantage of those whom we could 
easily best. 
 
This attitude is theorized and codified in Republic, in which philosophers disdain power to 
such an extent that they are literally dragged back amongst the masses and forced into 
governing. Much is made in undergraduate classes of the value of the philosopher king, but 
little attention is focused on Plato’s own failures at Syracuse.  
 
The superiority of the philosopher reappears in some form or another throughout the history 
of ideas from Aristotle to Nietzsche to Quine, especially in political theory, but it permeates 
contemporary professional life as well. Brian Leiter3 sums it up best when he remarks that it 
would be odd if any non-philosopher ever came up with an "interesting philosophical 
insight."4 This may be offensive to some, but Leiter sees himself as defending the concept 
of expertise itself. Philosophers are trained to do philosophy just as engineers are trained to 
do engineering, his position holds. Since no one expects an average person to design and 
build a bridge, no one should expect him or her to parse Hegel or define justice. 
 
Leiter’s position isn’t the full-blooded claim of superiority in Plato, but it still suggests 
qualitative and not quantitative difference; the analogy is faulty. Non-engineers are not 
asked to build bridges, but non-philosophers are required to make philosophical decisions 
every day, often with the most significant consequences.5 They make ethical judgments 
ranging from whether they should have an abortion to whether they should return excess 
change they received at the supermarket, metaphysical decisions about whether there is a 
God or whether their pets are capable of love, epistemological decisions such as 
determining if the person in a chat room is who she claims to be, and aesthetic decisions 
like whether a new hit song is good or just popular. Additionally, non-philosophers make 
countless logical decisions as they go about their daily lives, determining both the best 
means to an end and evaluating the possible consequences of hypothetical actions. 
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If Leiter is claiming that one has to have advanced training to become “the next Descartes,” 
so to speak, then statistics are on his side. In this case, Leiter would only be making a 
judgment about how best to be recognized within a specific professional community and his 
remarks would be about advancement, not philosophical content. If, however, he is claiming 
that non-philosophers cannot make good, sophisticated, meaningful, interesting, and 
sometimes even novel philosophical judgments or discoveries without advanced 
philosophical specialization, then either he hasn't a leg to stand on, or he has to reject 
democracy in virtually all of its forms. In essence, Leiter seems to be saying that non-
philosophers can’t do philosophy at all.6 
 
Democratic theory presupposes the philosophical and rational capacities of the general 
public, including assuming the ability to make defensible and complex moral and political 
judgments, and the meta-level skill of reflecting on and evaluating one’s own rationality. 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach” is only the latest politically-
oriented philosophy of education to glorify and cultivate the everyday intellect. Thus, if 
Leiter is even partially correct, it follows that philosophers are, by definition, better citizens 
and better decision-makers than everyone else. The empirical evidence for this is weak and I 
shall return to it below. 
 
In general, claims about the superiority of philosophers involve equivocations. Philosophers 
frequently use the term “philosophy” to signify the discipline, the craft, and the profession 
without acknowledging their differences, where the discipline refers to continuing 
established discourses and the craft means any form of philosophical inquiry. Nevertheless, 
one can do philosophy the craft with only focused reflection even though one needs to know 
something about philosophical traditions and it’s methods to engage the discipline. And, 
one can engage the discipline as a hobbyist and autodidact without being eligible for 
recognition within the profession.  
 
A generous interpretation of Leiter’s comment may be that all he is arguing is that being a 
professional philosopher is impossible without advanced degrees and significant 
specialization 7 , but even this isn’t a given. Credentials are indeed a prerequisite for 
philosophical employment, but this is a recent development. Many of oldest living 
philosophers secured significant academic employment without earning doctorates,8 and for 
many centuries before our own, publications and reputation, not official credentials, were 
the key to professional recognition.  
 
The Platonic Socrates, himself a non-academic philosopher by any definition, engaged 
the demos, and even though Plato only credits other philosophers with having 
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philosophical knowledge, 9 he made no meaningful distinction between the dialectic 
method of the discipline and the back and forth of everyday exploratory conversation. 
His interlocutors were slave boys and seers, strangers and playwrights, bullies and 
drunks, and prominent citizens.  
 
Socrates did philosophy in the agora. And while in our contemporary world, the only 
philosophy that seems to matter takes place in the university, this is more the result of social 
change than disciplinary necessity. The cloistering of academia in the medieval university, 
the professionalization of the disciplines in the 19th century, and the brute necessity of 
financing an academic lifestyle conspire to justify equivocating the profession of philosophy 
with all forms of philosophical inquiry. 
 
In short, public philosophy is not a purely contemporary phenomenon; it is simply a return 
to doing philosophy in the market place. I have argued elsewhere that recognizing the 
philosophical skills of general audiences is easier if we distinguish, not between those who 
do philosophy and those who do not, but between those who do professional philosophy and 
those who are amateurs.10 I compare philosophy to basketball, pointing out that while an 
amateur basketball player is not as skilled as a professional, all of them are still playing 
basketball. Analogously, while public philosophers may not be professionals, they are still 
doing philosophy. Their output may not meet the standard of the academy, but there is no 
evidence that this ought to be the measure of philosophical success in the first place. 
 
For a philosophical contribution to matter professionally, it must be academic and meet 
certain conditions. First, it ought to appear in print; while this is changing, it is still the 
case that items published in web-based journals are considered less prestigious than those 
on paper. 11  As a result, discussions in themselves don’t count even though the vast 
majority of public philosophy events consist almost entirely of people talking with one 
another. Second, philosophical contributions must be contextualized within the discipline; 
they must contain citations locating them in the discourse. This excludes any public 
philosophy event in which people are figuring things out for themselves because they lack 
background knowledge or haven’t read the relevant texts. Third, any contribution must be 
peer reviewed, but there are few products in public philosophy to peer review, and those 
that exist are aimed at different audiences than scholarly research.12 In fact, it is unclear 
which aspects of public philosophy are to be peer reviewed in the first place. Is it the 
philosopher leading the discussion, the audience he or she is talking with, or simply the 
words and ideas being investigated? And, who is the peer that does the reviewing, a 
member of the general audience or a professional philosopher?  
 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                            Weinstein | 37 
 
 
 
On many occasions, public philosophy may meet two out of three requirements—it may be 
in print and reference traditional texts—but peer review is public philosophy’s antithesis. 
And, because most professional philosophers see their work as analogous to research in 
science, the lack of peer review, the lack of explicit connection to a community of scholars 
who can vouch for its quality, relevance, and reproducibility, means that public philosophy 
loses a key component of its academic legitimacy.13  
 
Public philosophy is not academic philosophy done by other means. I would suggest 
instead, that we understand public philosophy, not as an analogue to the hard sciences as 
some suggest professional philosophy should be understood, nor as a form of literature, as 
Richard Rorty wants philosophy to be, but as a practice, as Alasdair MacIntyre understands 
the terms.14 Public philosophy has internal goods, intrinsic standards of success, is socially 
defined, and leads to human excellence in some form. This is philosophy without 
credentials, a craft only occasionally rooted in a discipline. By understanding it as such, we 
can recognize philosophy as a means of social interaction, something that can occur at 
informal gatherings or outside established institution, classrooms, libraries, or offices. But if 
philosophy can occur anywhere, what is its telos? If public philosophy is not research, what 
is it?  
 
At this point, it is worth acknowledging that there is no clear consensus about what 
philosophy in general does, doubly so when we ask about the profession and its discipline. 
Lawrence E. Cahoone identifies three distinct ends to the professionalized discipline, but 
cases could be made for others.15 Those of us who teach undergraduates are constantly 
asked to distinguish between continental and analytic philosophy for example, and we have 
to negotiate whether they constitute different methodologies, different traditions or even 
different subjects. Regardless, this twofold division that divides philosophy into, at 
minimum, two literary types doesn’t do justice to the sub-disciplines of History of 
Philosophy, Logic, and Rhetoric. These may be incommensurable, they may have different 
teloi and purposes, but they may not. Is philosophy the search for wisdom or truth? Does it 
reveal cultural presuppositions or simply tell interesting stories? Does it analyze language or 
recount the structure of experience? Is it the examination and elaboration of other work 
already called philosophy? These are complicated debates that I will not delve into here, but 
for now, my operating definition is that it philosophy is the study of the fundamental 
assumptions of any discipline. 
 
I recognize this definition’s controversial nature and lack of justification, but it is as close to 
an umbrella description that applies to the discipline and the craft, their content, and their 
professionalized manifestation. It allows for the fact that every discipline has philosophies 
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related to it and that the questions its practitioners can ask are about the unnoticed structures 
of disciplinary discourse. Furthermore, it is a definition that, in my experience, public 
philosophy audiences understand. It allows them to get the overall point of philosophy and 
see some connection between what I do as a professional and what they do as amateurs. 
Professional philosophers will do doubt take issue with it, but amateurs get its point. 
 
In contrast to philosophy simpliciter, public philosophy denotes the act of professional 
philosophers engaging with non-professionals, in a non-academic setting, with the specific 
goals of exploring issues philosophically. In other words, public philosophy involves 
getting people to think about the assumptions that govern the things they do, the 
controversies they are immersed in, and the experiences of their day-to-day lives by looking 
at those aspects that are either invisible to them or taken for granted. Public philosophy and 
philosophy as it is usually understood are not too far apart, although their audiences differ 
radically. What public philosophy need not be, however, is professionalized and refined.16 
 
2. Public philosophy and citizenship 
 
Public philosophy is often justified in the same way that public humanities programs in 
general are: it exists to cultivate better citizens.17 In a democracy, the argument goes, better 
informed individuals, better arguers, more rational, objective, and big-picture-seeing 
individuals can make better decisions, thereby improving collective self-government. 
Furthermore, people are not always good at seeing their own true needs and can easily get 
wrapped up in either false desires or short-term goals. Philosophy then, it is said, helps 
agents see past these limitations to better pursue their authentic ends. 
 
Once again, this point of view originates with the Socratic ideal, Apology most specifically, 
although Aristophanes maligns it. It is reinforced by Rousseau’s conception of the General 
Will, Mill’s justification for liberty, and even Marx, during those rare moments when he 
allows for a self-determining proletariat and the overcoming of false consciousness. In this 
sense then, and despite often-narrow interpretations of Mill, philosophy is usually 
understood as a central element of positive liberty. Most philosophers presume that one 
cannot fulfill one’s own potential as a citizen or autonomous individual without it. 
 
Like all versions of positive liberty, this approach is in tension with its negative counterpart 
as well as with the kind of democratic capitalism that presumes individual agents are the 
most qualified to make decisions for themselves. As Adam Smith puts it, “Every man… is 
first and principally recommended to his own care; and every man is certainly, in every 
respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself than of any other person.”18 
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Taken out of context, Smith seems to be arguing that all people can, simply by being 
themselves, make the best decisions regarding their own care and betterment, but much of 
Smith’s work is a qualification of this statement, enumerating exactly how individuals are to 
gain better perspective, a more potent intellect, and a more empathetic moral point of 
view.19 In other words, Smith gives significant attention to the meaning of ‘informed’ in the 
term informed consent.  
 
Nevertheless, the notion, in and of itself, of the unquestioned competence of the unmodified 
individual, can be found as a thread running through much of the liberal tradition. Berlin 
makes little of self-awareness in his famous discussion of negative liberty and Taylor 
responds with a devastating critique reasserting personal growth.20 Taylor’s Hegelianism 
butts its own head against Karl Popper liberal critique of authoritarian claims of false 
consciousness, and Hayek reaffirms Popper’s point of view in his glorification of the 
localized knowledge created by the free market. All this suggests that in some important 
sense, the notion that philosophy makes better citizens is anti-liberal, not pro-liberal as is 
often assumed. At minimum, it runs counter to the more libertarian interpretations of 
modern individualism.21 
 
Of course, some might take issue with this characterization of liberalism. Locke, Mill and 
many other liberals see persuasion as the cornerstone of individualism and Smith saw price 
and the impartial spectator as providing the requisite aggregate information for economic 
and moral knowledge respectively; he also argued for mandatory education in philosophy 
and science.22 It is no accident that each of these thinkers devotes some of their writing to 
the importance of education; liberalism, and self-improvement are intimate siblings.  
 
Nevertheless, while the necessities of participation,23 —the skills and capabilities required 
for political life—are philosophical in nature and are often reduced to philosophical 
techniques such as argumentation analysis and reconstruction, the claim that philosophy as a 
discipline, craft, or profession is a prerequisite for individual judgment inherently discredits 
the wisdom, judgment, and rationality that the liberal individual is supposed to act upon 
naturally. 24  The mythical “age of reason,” that moment when an individual becomes 
capable of adult reasoning, marks the necessary intellectual standard for political 
participation. It is also a sufficient intellectual condition.25 If philosophy in any form is a 
prerequisite for political participation, then it usurps the purpose of the age of reason. In 
other words, if the liberal individual needs to do more than reach this age, whatever it may 
be, if he or she needs to be philosophical as well, then the individual ceases to be the kind of 
person liberalism traditionally describes.  
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My argument here is that liberal theory cannot depend upon philosophy to legitimize 
citizenship; to do so would be to contradict the central premise that individuals are entitled 
to participate qua individual. This means that one cannot fall back on liberalism to justify 
public philosophy’s existence either. The liberal individual must be capable of participation 
qua individual. 
 
Although some might want to argue that philosophy and public philosophy might make 
citizens better, it is unclear what better would means in this context. Being more informed 
or a more successful rhetor may lead to more personal satisfaction or more power, but these 
are not the proper goals of the citizen, at least not according to the minimal liberal standard 
that is it’s normative core. Wanting citizens to be more successful is to confuse the 
profession of politics with the practice of political participation, an equivocation analogous 
to the equating of philosophy the profession and philosophy the craft as described above.  
 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether philosophy, even if it could inform the general populace, 
would have any effect on political life. The argument that public philosophy makes people 
better citizens assumes that rational argumentation plays an essential part in democratic 
participation. Yet, it is easy to be skeptical of this claim. Politicians lie, issues-ads 
manipulate, and overt words are rarely as important as subtext. As cognitive science 
advances in its ability to explain how the mind works, it also provides those in the media 
with the tools and knowledge to subvert rational decision-making by emphasizing 
unconscious, emotive and neurochemical influences. Research has shown, for example, that 
merely making a package green makes consumers think a product is environmentally 
responsible.26 Semiotics is neither logic nor rhetoric, yet it is often much more persuasive. 
 
It is not just the politicians and media who are dishonest or manipulative. Citizens 
consistently act on false information, skewed attitudes, gut reactions, prejudices, and 
malicious motives. For example, a 2011 poll suggested that, in the United Sates, 51 percent 
of Republicans believed that the American President Barack Obama was born outside the 
U.S., a figure that had increased from 44 percent in 2009.27 These polls show that additional 
conversations and continuous debates about the issue actually increased ignorance rather 
than mitigated false belief, a violation of the liberal optimism about deliberative democracy. 
Even the Republican operative Karl Rove tried to persuade his fellows that Obama was born 
in the U.S., but they would not be swayed.28 More exposure to ideas and debate solidified 
ignorance; it did not rectify it. The “birthers” won the public imagination despite their lies 
and misdirection. 
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As is well known, the argument for publicizing fringe positions in the U.S. is a remnant of 
the equal time doctrine, a 1934 Federal Law mandating broadcast media provide equal 
access to the airwaves for all political parties. In the public mind, this evolved into a general 
position on fairness, a philosophical commitment that public argument must consider all 
“sides” of an issue when publicizing a debate. However, as many a philosopher has said 
before a classroom of undergraduates, equal time may be worthwhile for the most 
controversial unresolved issues like abortion, the death penalty, the legitimacy of individual 
wars, or citizen initiatives about immigration, but it misleads when it comes to brute fact or 
accepted science. Allowing the famed Flat Earth Society rebuttal time whenever a news 
story involves space travel, for example, is not what either the equal time or fairness 
doctrines intend. 
 
This compulsive need to present even the most blatantly false positions on every issue—the 
philosophically motivated need to offer a rational, logical response to all claims—may very 
well be a prime example of philosophy actually distorting public discourse. The intellectual 
practice of refuting all criticism may be a prerequisite for a philosophical treatise. It may 
even be a successful heuristic. But it is not suitable for public political discourse. Public 
philosophy will not redeem this practice. It will only make responding to untenable 
objections into a sport, a conversion that I do not object to, but one that is more akin to 
entertainment than civic education. In short, ignorance and voter behavior wouldn’t likely 
change if we mandate that the entire population take advanced critical thinking classes or 
visit public philosophy events. In this section, I am arguing only against the position that 
public philosophy creates better citizens. 
 
Consider an exchange I heard on public radio. A retired engineer called in to a program 
about the future of the nuclear industry expressing his concern that nuclear power plants 
contribute to global warming. He remarked that nuclear plants were notoriously inefficient 
and as a result, they give off a lot of heat. The featured guest, an expert in the technology, 
responded that nuclear power plants don’t create carbon emissions. Since they just heat up 
water, they do not effect climate change, and this ought to be considered one of their 
virtues. The caller responded by arguing that the heating of water is exactly the problem; 
nuclear energy “adds warmth,” he insisted. The expert explained further that thermal heat is 
an entirely different product than CO2 and patiently repeated that it had no effect on the 
environment, but the caller once again insisted that these plants were still warm and 
passionately asked why people weren’t worrying about its effect. The back and forth lasted 
about 60 seconds—an eternity on the radio—until the host cut off his call. 
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This is an anecdote and proves nothing, but it is instructive. The caller was uninformed, 
shockingly so if he were indeed an engineer as he claimed. But he was also genuinely 
concerned. He was doing everything he was supposed to: being a good citizen, participating 
in the public discourse, asking for more information, and trying to help solve a problem for 
the betterment of human kind. He was the very ideal of an engaged person. Public 
philosophy would not have helped him past his ignorance of basic physics. Instead, what he 
needed was a good dose of the “appeal to authority” fallacy. He should have understood that 
an expert was telling him he was wrong, that the person was an expert because the radio 
said so, and that he should probably reconsider his opinion precisely because the expert was 
telling him to. This is the very point Leiter made about philosophy and there is indeed an 
important role for expertise in our culture. The fact that this particular caller assumed his 
opinion was of the same caliber as the specialists’ is a serious problem for public discourse. 
 
I do not mean to suggest that the caller should not have engaged in further investigation 
after the fact, but I do suggest that he should have paid enough attention to the guest to at 
least doubt his own point of view. To put it another way, and to quote an old Yiddish 
proverb, “if three people tell you you’re drunk, go home.” 29 Individual conviction and 
perspective have serious limitations and a community of experts ought indeed be respected, 
even, or perhaps, especially in, a democracy. 
 
In public philosophy, the tension between the specialist and the generalist is what I call 
elsewhere, the problem of expertise. 30 If non-philosophers are to do philosophy of any kind, 
they must acknowledge that the discipline requires background knowledge. Someone who is 
familiar with the tradition has an advantage, and someone who brings in specialized 
knowledge from other fields ought to have significant influence in relevant debate, even if 
only as a touchstone to ground the discussion rounded in reality, as it ought to have done for 
the radio program.  
 
A good general education would have helped the caller. A college course or a few readings 
in basic thermodynamics would have as well. But public philosophy would have not. What 
this person needed was time, long-term reflection and study, precisely the opposite of what 
public philosophy provides. An average public philosophy event is an hour to ninety 
minutes, revolves around a discussion that is self-contained and requires no advanced 
planning or previous knowledge, and the host has to be as welcoming and supportive of the 
audience as possible, so as not to alienate people. It takes a very special interlocutor to 
correct people at a public philosophy event. One can do it, but it’s difficult and necessitates 
a very delicate touch.  
 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                            Weinstein | 43 
 
 
 
I return therefore to my claim above that democratic deliberation is frequently irrational and 
is usually not improved by advancing philosophical skills. How much rational thought is 
involved in voting behavior is still a matter of controversy, but most studies suggest very 
little.31 Again, I won’t get into the details here. I will reveal however, that I do subscribe to 
the contemporary notion that reasoning is fluid and that different rationalities can be built 
on different and contradictory assumptions. 32  But, regardless of what definition of 
rationality we settle on, we should have to be intellectually honest about what people 
believe and what has to happen for them to change their minds. Just as political science 
doubts the presence of rational voter behavior, some in the argumentation theory 
community question whether we can ever persuade someone of anything; not to mention 
that discourse is always complicated by confirmation bias, belief persistence, and 
confabulation. When persuasion does happen, it is rarely the consequence of an editorial or 
a well-reasoned presentation. 
 
Allow me to be clear. I do not mean to claim that no one can be persuaded of anything ever, 
but rather that the stronger the conviction, the less argument-inspired any cognitive change 
will be. The possibility of persuasion diminishes radically in the political realm, or so a 
myriad of studies bear out.33 The mistake that Mill and others make is to assume that our 
political beliefs are predominantly rational, and that we must deemphasize the emotive 
components because they, somehow, have less moral worth. I think that attitude is built on 
an empirically false moral psychology and a problematic normative account of what matters 
intellectually. Furthermore, it seems to me that the more polarized a society is, the less 
rational persuasion can bridge difference. This may mean, as Amartya Sen argues, that in 
the face of the “good grounds for skepticism about the practical effectiveness of reasoned 
discussion,” that reason “may be particularly important.”34 But this doesn’t change the fact 
that reason is the exception to the rule. We may have to renegotiate the honoring of reason 
above all else. 
 
Case in point: A close friend who served in the National Guard and is currently an officer in 
a state police force recalls the exact moment that she changed her mind about gays serving 
openly in the military; she was moved by something someone said in the television show 
The West Wing. Until that point, she was opposed to integrating hetero- and homosexual 
soldiers based on, among other things, fear of dissent and disorder in the ranks.35 But then, a 
black actor pretending to be a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said this:  
 
The problem with that is that's what they were saying about me 50 years ago. Blacks 
shouldn't serve with whites. It would disrupt the unit. You know what? It did disrupt 
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the unit. The unit got over it. The unit changed. [Now] I'm an admiral in the U.S. 
Navy and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff... Beat that with a stick.36 
 
The friend describes her response as a simple “huh,” perhaps best understood as a less 
dramatic eureka moment. She realized that her mind was changed; she did not consciously 
alter her attitude. She witnessed the cognitive change as an outsider. More importantly, 
though, this did not happen during a professional debate or because of an opinion piece. It 
happened because she identified with a character and saw herself in him. 
 
Is there an argument in the actor’s comments? Informal logicians will want us to think so, 
but one would have to add so many missing premises to reconstruct it that it would no 
longer be the speaker’s argument; it would be the viewer’s. He certainly announced a 
conclusion, but the missing premises and warrants would come via interpretation, not 
reportage. This is argument creation, not argument reconstruction, and, as such, I am 
reluctant to assert that he is making an argument in any meaningful sense of the word. At 
most he is inspiring viewers to come up with their own arguments—to argue from a 
conclusion—and the results would come in many variations, even though they would all be, 
in theory, compatible with his point of view. 
 
In the end, my friend was not persuaded by an argument. She was moved by an intuitive 
reaction to an analogy, a comparison that may or may not be historically accurate, recited by 
an actor reading lines that may or may not reflect an actual experience. It was the kind of 
reproduction of a reproduction that Plato’s Socrates rejects. It was also the most effective 
way to change her mind; she still holds to the new position, vociferously, a decade and a 
half later. 
 
Again, this is only an anecdote, but it is one of many. One could find endless examples of 
people choosing sneakers because an actor they like told them to, or consumers with 
immovable brand loyalty to products that are identical in virtually every way to their 
competition, or fan loyalties to sports teams based on arbitrary factors such as where one 
lives or who their parents supported.37 These examples are all standard fare for critical 
thinking textbooks. What I mean to argue then is simply that if public philosophy were able 
to make people better citizens, it would have to disarm all of these factors to change 
political outcomes. It doesn’t and it can’t.  
 
Furthermore, if public philosophy promoted excellence in citizenship then it would follow 
that I am, by definition, a better or more informed citizen than others, simply because I 
engage in public philosophy regularly. And, if this were true, it would also suggest that I 
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have the moral responsibility of coming down from on high as Zarathustra does, or letting 
myself be dragged back into the cave as Plato’s guardians demand. Paolo Friere famously 
critiques this “banking model of education” in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and frankly, 
I’m really uncomfortable with this role, for just the reasons he cites. 38  There is no 
philosophical noblesse oblige.  
 
Do I believe my political opinions are correct? Yes. Do I want those who disagree with me 
to be quiet, stay at home, and abstain from the next election? I most certainly do. But this 
isn’t because I’m a philosopher and my opponents are not; it’s because I think I’m right, and 
because, like most people, I want the policies I prefer.  
 
John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, and many others caution against assuming our own 
infallibility. As prescribed, I am open -minded enough to recognize that I could be mistaken 
on any particular issue. But this is only theoretical awareness and it doesn’t mean someone 
won’t have a hard time persuading me I’m wrong about those positions I’m committed to. 
I’m supposed to have conviction and I would suggest then that democratic participation has 
more in common with Thomas Kuhn’s tenacious scientists who hold onto their points of 
view39 until the bitter end than it does with Mill’s and Russell’s open-minded practitioners 
of liberty. Democratic commitments parallel MacIntyre’s remarks on the competing truth 
commitments of coexisting traditions:  
 
…within every major cultural and social tradition we find some distinctive 
conception of the human good presented as — true. And although these claims to 
truth are supported within different traditions by appeal to rival and often de facto 
incommensurable standards of rational justifications, no such tradition is or can be 
relativistic about the truth of its own assertions or about truth.40  
 
In other words, I have to be committed to my truths even if I recognize that they may turn 
out to be false because one cannot be committed and relativistic at the same time. And while 
I must fight through those things that impair my attempts at objectivity—confirmation bias, 
conflicts-of-interest, brute selfishness, ignorance—I also have to trust myself enough to act 
on my political beliefs. Without such convictions, I am left with mere preference, inaction, 
or Stephen Colbert’s self-consciously absurd truthiness.  
 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that people cannot become better citizens. Nor am I 
suggesting that education as a whole, that Bildung, does not contribute significantly to this 
process. I believe quite strongly that liberal education is an essential component of 
democracy, and that it makes people’s participation more defensible and more in tune with 
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the values of a stable pluralistic society; I have written about this in detail for much of my 
career. My claim instead is that the practice of public philosophy does not create better 
citizens, in part because Bildung is a life-long, intensive, systematic approach to 
understanding the world in an integrated way, and that public philosophy is ephemeral with 
no necessary or even explicit connection between one public philosophy experience and 
another.41 Over time education allows for communication with expertise, mentorships and 
directed study, but public philosophy does none of these things because it is too discrete. It 
only creates a temporary space where a philosopher acts as a catalyst for ephemeral group-
based exploration, and where the criteria of success are discovered and revised by often-
uninformed participants.  
 
I therefore reiterate both my claim that public philosophy does not make better citizens and 
my question asking what it does instead. In order to better answer the latter, I shall change 
my approach and find theory in practice rather than the other way around. With this in 
mind, in the next section, I discuss the characteristics of a successful public philosophy 
event and examine what can be generalized from them. My aim is to show what actually 
works and what people really do get out of them.  
 
3. Public Philosophy in Practice 
 
I am the host of Why? Philosophical Discussions About Everyday Life (or Why? Radio for 
short),42 a public radio show in which philosophers discuss their research in ways that are 
accessible to non-professionals. We will be starting our sixth season soon, and we have an 
international audience of both philosophy professionals and amateurs.43 I’ve also hosted 
film series, given talks, and written and edited volumes for the general public. In each, my 
job was to get people to think philosophically, sometimes for the first time in their lives, and 
to walk away feeling good about the event. I have described this process as “a bit like a first 
drug deal — we give you this one for free because we know that you’ll get hooked, hoping 
that you’ll come back on your own, a regular compelled by an inner desire for more.”44 
Here’s how I elaborated on my role:  
 
But just as I’m not teacher in this context, I’m also not a drug dealer. Neither am I 
the wizened old philosopher who has come down from the mountain or dared 
entered the cave to lead the ignorant through the darkness. I’m a huckster, a 
playmate, the guy who offers the promise of something new, something exciting. I 
hope it’s something hip but I’ll settle for being a pleasant distraction. I aim to be the 
mythical guy you might want to share a beer with, but hope to be someone with 
whom you’d enjoy a nice stroll, chatting away while you notice how the leaves have 
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turned color or the water seems very high this year. Eventually, maybe, you’ll want 
to go to a museum with me and share your thoughts on a painting, consider my point 
of view to modify your own, and dare the joint project of embracing the avante 
garde; that object d’art that makes you uncomfortable but compels you to it all the 
same. But I admit, I’ll settle for the beer and see what happens next. Just getting you 
on the stool next to me is hard enough. 
 
Virtually every philosopher I know bristles at the notion that philosophy can be a “pleasant 
distraction.” Perhaps this is because, when it comes to the subject itself, philosophers tend 
toward the conservative, holding fast to the classical belief that philosophy is foundational 
to all knowledge, that it is the umbrella discipline. By conservative, I do not mean to imply 
an ideology. Instead, I mean that philosophers hold tight to the philosophical canon, they are 
largely resistant to change, obsessed rankings—this is most evident in the philosophy 
blogosphere, in which article after article seeks to determine the top fifty doctoral programs, 
the ten most influential journals, or the most cited or influential philosophers of recent 
times—and philosophers tend to be insular, often resisting the legitimacy of other or 
interdisciplinary discourses. 
 
Maybe this is the result of the deep need philosophers have for validation, the remnant of 
Thales’s humiliation and revenge, or maybe it is because we believe that the discipline is 
inherently important. The tenuous nature of funding and the perceived attack on philosophy 
in the modern university certainly plays a role in our defensiveness. Nevertheless, nothing 
alienates a non-academic audience more than acting with entitlement, and philosophers who 
walk into a public event projecting the belief that they are the smartest people in the room 
will experience a very unsympathetic response. While many people like to learn, most are 
uncomfortable with being taught. So, whatever I do, I have to act as a role model rather than 
a teacher. I have to show, not tell, and to commit myself to the project to make people want 
to join with me. This is not teaching in any traditional sense and I think any attempt to think 
of a public philosophy event as a class or an academic lecture will limit its success and 
acceptance. People are in the audience by choice and unlike students, they can leave at any 
time and for any reason. They are not being graded. 
 
My first rule of public philosophy then, is “let them see you think.” Consider how rarely 
one sees professional interviewers contemplate on the job, or pause as they consider the 
next question or reframe the discussion. The most polished ones move from sentence to 
sentence flawlessly, sacrificing the follow-up question in order to appear practiced and 
smooth. Consider also how few politician answer debate question with the phrase “I don’t 
know.” How can democracy presume fallibility if leaders refuse to publicly consider 
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alternatives or fail to acknowledge their own limitations? Finally, consider how often all of 
us start talking before an answer comes to us and then change midstream as we realized that 
what we are saying doesn’t make sense, but refuse to acknowledge changing our minds. 
Silence ought to be part of conversations, but real-world arguments tend to become mile-a-
minute sprints. They become louder and faster as they continue on rather than more pensive 
and articulate. 
 
Philosophy, whatever it is, involves thinking, but much American culture, at least, makes 
the thought process invisible. It is therefore my job, as a public philosopher to stop, ponder, 
and acknowledge the rational deliberation that happens in my head. If I get to think, the 
audience gets to think. Public philosophy gives people permission to engage their intellect 
in a community space. 
 
This shouldn’t mislead. This type of philosophy is public, but it is not collective the way 
that academic philosophy is. As I already remarked, as a professional philosopher, we read 
others’ work and integrate it into our research. Our writing must show that we are aware of 
the relevant literature, show what we have learned from it, indicate how we advance the 
field, and document where we disagree. Our publications are peer reviewed and evaluated, 
and one of the great pleasures of being a philosopher is presenting a professional audience 
with our ideas and answering their challenges when the lecture is done. Most philosophers 
revel in intellectual combat.  
 
Public philosophy, however, is individualistic, not collective. The initial discussion happens 
with others, but the real deliberation happens once the event is over. The ultimate goal of 
public philosophy is to get the audience to take the issues away with them. Whenever 
people remark that they went home and told their spouses, partners, roommates, or friends 
about the event, and that, in the end, they had a long discussion because of it, this marks the 
event’s success because it reflects the fact that the audience member has established 
ownership over the debate. This may be the closest public philosophy events get to actual 
peer review. 45  It is an indication that he or she has something to say, something to 
contemplate, something to, for lack of a better term, put on the table. True public 
philosophy events allow people to see the world slightly differently in a narrow but 
powerful way. But this is not something that they will necessarily build on, and it doesn’t 
have the same relationship to the community that professional research has to the scholars 
that predated it. Ironically, public philosophy is private. It has more in common with the 
meditations of Siddhartha than it does the scholasticism of Aquinas.  
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Public philosophy is also passionate. Good academic philosophers must remain detached 
and self-critical. They must consider arguments in light of research, against their own 
beliefs, and present them in a cool scientific voice. The passion is always behind the 
scene—part of the motivation, not the content. In fact, one of the hardest things about 
learning to write academic philosophy is removing one’s personality from the text. Articles 
and books are often flat, frequently boring, and regularly interchangeable. Ideas become 
associated with individual philosophers, but prose styles are much harder to distinguish. 
There are exceptions, of course, but the odd trajectory of a research life is losing one’s 
personality through one’s doctoral dissertation and then slowly, usually post-tenure if not 
significantly later, carefully reinserting it back into one’s text. Senior philosophers’ writing 
is usually easily identified as such, not simply because their abilities are often more 
developed, but because their advanced positions permit them the latitude to put 
idiosyncratic voice into their work. 
 
Public philosophy, in contrast, is all about personality. Radio listeners do not develop a 
relationship with individual episodes; they develop one with me. Certainly, people may 
come to Why? Radio because of a specific topic or guest, but they will stay because of how 
they identify with my attitude, presentation, and presence. The same is true with my film 
festivals or my public writing. It has to feel like me or the regulars are disappointed. Public 
philosophy challenges the philosophical commitment that ideas matter instead of people. 
 
Philosophers will claim that a moral precept is equally true or false regardless of who utters 
it. But public philosophy attaches the argument to the presenter and, as such, nothing is 
more detrimental to the project than hypocrisy or inauthenticity. It emphasizes ethos as 
much as logos. If I fail as an interlocutor, then the event and the philosophy, comes 
collapsing around me. This is reminiscent of the classroom because teachers play essential 
roles in motivating students, but most students understand that a class may be important 
even if they don’t like the instructor. Public philosophers don’t have such luxuries. Again, 
public philosophy is not teaching.46 
 
Is subsuming the idea under the person fair? Is it not a violation of the independence of 
ideas? Does it not conflate the knower and the thing that is known? To answer these 
questions in reverse, yes it conflates the knower and the known, yes it does seem to give 
less importance to ideas, but as for fairness, I’m not sure the concept applies. My goal in 
public philosophy is not to get the audience to increase their philosophical sophistication, 
but rather to prepare the groundwork for future philosophical deliberation. Academic 
philosophy reaps; public philosophy sows. It prepares the ground, plants the seeds, and 
waters the crops. But the shoots come later, the buds even later than that. As a professor I 
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get to see my students bloom. As a public philosopher, I am ecstatic if all I have done is turn 
the dirt.  
 
Here then we have the first step to finding out what public philosophy does. It prepares 
people for future philosophical insight. It does not, as professional philosophers hope for 
their own work, answer questions so much as it prepares interlocutors to ask them. Public 
philosophy is future oriented. It seeks to create openness where there may not be any. 
 
Another key characteristic of public philosophy is that its philosophers advocate for 
audiences and not ideas. We have to make those in attendance feel like co-creators of the 
content and (often) persuade then of their worthiness to be there. This is qualitatively 
different than whatever self-esteem building teachers try in class. Furthermore, when I teach 
a philosopher in class, I want each student to be persuaded by the text and the argument that 
we discuss; I teach every philosophy as if it were true. But then, when we move on to the 
next text and I want my students to reject the previous philosopher for the current one. This 
process is supposed to train them to adopt the critical perspective, to understand the 
philosophical method and to, eventually, step outside themselves and create a philosophical 
persona to criticize their own work. They have to be Aristotle to their own Plato, Hegel to 
their own Kant, Rousseau to their own Locke. 
 
So, while the goal of teaching philosophy is to create independent philosophers who can 
defend their views against ideas that get thrown at them, there will never be independence 
in public philosophy. There isn’t enough time or enough discipline. What I have to work 
against instead is the anti-intellectualism of the dominant culture and the intellectual 
laziness of habit. I advocate for the audience by giving them, again, permission to peek into 
the deep recesses of their convictions. When the conversation is technical or alienating, it is 
my job, not to teach new terminology, but to move away from jargon. If the questions are 
too complex, I have to redirect them and make them simpler. If the audience’s questions are 
unfocused or irrelevant, I have to find a way to utilize their experience, saying those things 
that the people would have said if their thoughts were clearer. Again, there is overlap with 
the classroom, but the progress is much more spontaneous. Public philosophy events are 
fluid because audiences remain unknown. There can be no lesson plans at public philosophy 
events, only an agenda, at best. 
 
This should not suggest that public philosophy doesn’t use technical terms, doesn’t 
introduce new concepts, or doesn’t allow for complexity or sophistication. It is just 
presented in a different way. The more technical aspects approach from the periphery. 
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We are now watching a picture of public philosophy come into focus. It models thinking, is 
individualistic not collective, it is built on personality not ideas, is passionate and not 
detached, and advocates for people not ideas. It seeks to prepare ground for future 
philosophical endeavors, and while the questions asked may be about any area of life, 
knowledge or inquiry, it should become obvious that public philosophical investigation 
skews towards the individuals who happen to be there. Most public philosophy involves 
examination of one’s own personal life. It is about self-knowledge before it is about 
anything else. 
 
The Delphic oracle’s command to know thyself is often considered to be the core of 
philosophical investigation, but the form it takes in discussion is much more commonly the 
formulation that the unexamined life is not worth living. The pursuit of self-knowledge is a 
perennial theme in philosophy. However, the difference between the traditional usage and 
public philosophy’s is that for the professional philosopher, self-knowledge is a starting 
point for other inquiries about nature, reality, justice, knowledge, God, etc. Public 
philosophy offers no such guarantee of future questioning, again, because the event is so 
short and because there is no promise that one inquiry will build on another. I certainly want 
my public philosophical interlocutors to see society in a different way, but the best path to 
this insight is if they see their relationship with society in a different way. Public 
philosophy is dominated by its rhetorical and pedagogical strategies. 
 
My tentative answer to the question “what does public philosophy do?” should therefore be 
understood as follows: public philosophy creates the groundwork for philosophical 
reflection in personal life with the hope and that this reflection may inspire future wide-
ranging conversations about culture and meaning in life. It is a return to the Delphic 
command to know thyself, but it sees this project as entertainment or hobby, not as a moral 
imperative. Public philosophy is a good in itself because it is not judged by its 
consequences; an event can be successful without leading to further inquiry. If public 
philosophy were justified by its contribution to citizenship, it would only be an instrumental 
good, but entertainment is valuable in itself. Contemplation and reflection are as well, even 
when contemplation and reflection themselves become entertainment. 
 
It is worth mentioning that public philosophy is good marketing. As funding for philosophy 
departments, faculty, and programming decrease, a philosophically engaged public is more 
likely to support the professional endeavor. It is odd that so many professional philosophers 
find public philosophy threatening and discredit it as illegitimate work. It is in all of our best 
interests to engage the taxpayers and allow them to experience the value of what we do. But 
this political and financial benefit is also an instrumental good. In the end, the value of 
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public philosophy is the ephemeral experience that audiences have while doing it. They are 
engaged, they are enjoying themselves and they are entertained. 
 
Conclusion 
  
In After Virtue Alasdair Macintyre provisionally concludes “the good life for man is the 
life spent in seeking for the good life for man.”47 He argues that this search for meaning 
is best described as a quest because a quest has rules—it is a practice—and because it 
can be evaluated on its own terms, not based on the success or failures of its outcome. 
All this, I think, can be said of public philosophy as well. 48 Public philosophy is a 
practice; it has an internal logic and intrinsic standards of success. Academic philosophy 
is only a success if something new is brought to the table, if the researcher contributes 
meaningfully to his or her field. But public philosophy may lead to trite, hackneyed, or 
familiar conclusions, and still be considered successful because it brings something new 
to the individual, perhaps a new perspective or maybe just the realization that 
intellectual life can be fun. These are modest goals, but they are important, and they are 
goods in themselves. Brian Leiter’s demand for interesting philosophical discoveries is 
as absurd for public philosophy as it is irrelevant. 
 
I think MacIntyre is right that the good life for people is the search for the good life for 
people. But his quest is not the property of academic philosophers and it is not limited to 
disciplined, professionalized, career-long research. It comes in spurts and starts and the 
changes that may result can take virtually any form. Will this result in people being better 
citizens? I suppose it could, but it also might result in a person being a better parent, being 
more aware of the beauty of flowers, or simply being more interesting and fun. Chances are 
it will result in none of those things. In the end, I’m just not qualified to say. My job as a 
public philosopher is to prepare the ground and to let people figure it all out on their own. I 
turn the dirt and watch what grows. 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1  This paper was first presented as a keynote address at the 2011 South Minnesota State University 
Undergraduate Conference; I have happily incorporated the excellent audience comments into my argument. 
It was revised during a visit to the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna, Austria, Fall, 
2013. Paul Sum helped me navigate the relevant literature in political science, and Lawrence Cahoone and 
Mark Weinstein commented on early drafts. As always, I am tremendously grateful to all those who help me 
refine my ideas.  
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2 The story is found in Aristotle Politics 1259a. It reads: “Thales, so the story goes, because of his poverty was 
taunted with the uselessness of philosophy; but from his knowledge of astronomy he had observed while it 
was still winter that there was going to be a large crop of olives, so he raised a small sum of money and paid 
round deposits for the whole of the olive-presses in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a low rent as nobody 
was running him up; and when the season arrived, there was a sudden demand for a number of presses at the 
same time, and by letting them out on what terms he liked he realized a large sum of money, so proving that it 
is easy for philosophers to be rich if they choose, but this is not what they care about” (Aristotle, Politics, 
Translated by Harris Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), p. 55). 
 
3 Brian Leiter is the most relevant commentator here because he has become the unofficial official gatekeeper 
of philosophical status. He administrates The Philosophical Gourmet, an annual ranking of the professional 
perceptions of the top doctoral programs in philosophy. What may be of more interest is his popular blog in 
which he dispenses professional news, reports of faculty appointments, remarks on and critiques philosophical 
work, and shares his political opinions. It can be found at http://leiterreports.typepad.com/. Mark Oppenheimer 
called Leiter “the most powerful man in academic philosophy,” (“The Philosophical Kingmaker” The Boston 
Globe, April 20, 2008).  
 
4 Leiter’s full remark is that regarding “the ordinary person on the street,” without advanced and specialized 
education, “the likelihood of interesting philosophical insight is probably pretty limited, though of course, 
what ordinary people think is often the data point of what philosophers are interested in.” He added that they 
could only have such insight, “by chance.” Why? Philosophical Discussions About Everyday Life, episode 20 
(September 20, 2002). 
 
5 One might object that non-engineers are expected to build bookcases, stack objects so they do not topple, and 
improvise solutions to many household engineering tasks. However, the impact of this kind of amateur 
engineering is not on par with the moral decisions that people are faced to make in their daily lives. 
 
6 It might be objected that even if we grant that there are non-philosophers who make better decisions than 
philosophers, they cannot articulate their ideas or arguments as well. The decisions may also not be as 
warranted. I would respond by asking what better or warranted means in this case. Is there some universal 
standards at play or are professional philosophers’ articulations and warrants simply more in line with the 
practices of formal and informal logic? Most likely, better refers to the latter, but these structures are 
themselves controversial, even within the history of philosophy. For example, the relevance of the syllogism 
and the enthymeme have been challenged more than once. As Locke put it, rejecting Aristotelian logic, “ God 
has not been so sparing to Men to make them barely two-legged Creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make 
them Rational” (Locke, Essay, IV.xvii.4, 671). In other words, what constitutes better or worse reasoning is 
not a given. (For a detailed discussion of the eighteenth-century retreat from formal logic, see Jack Russell 
Weinstein, Adam Smith’s Pluralism: Rationality, Education, and the Moral Sentiments (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, pp. 109-128).  
 
7 I do not think this interpretation is defensible because it runs counter to his claim that philosophical insight is 
the exclusive domain of the philosopher. Nevertheless, it is worth being generous for the sake of argument. 
 
8 Burton Dreben, Saul Kripke, and Alasdair MacIntyre are prominent examples.  
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9 I have in mind Diotima in Symposium and the Eleatic Stranger in Sophist and the Statesman. 
 
10 Jack Russell Weinstein “Philosophy and its Public,” On Second Thought (“The Philosophy Issue”), North 
Dakota Humanities Council, (June, 2010), pg. 6. 
 
11 As contributors to Essays in Philosophy are no doubt aware of and struggle with. 
 
12 The prevalence of philosophy and popular culture books series is a perfect example of how these two 
standards do not mesh well. While many of these volumes are quite good, the individual essays rarely meet the 
academic standards for original contributions to the field of philosophy. If they did, their intended audience 
would likely not read them.  
 
13 I would argue that economics has been the most successfully discipline in either the social sciences or the 
humanities to model itself on science, although I would also suggest that this is a rhetorical victory and that 
economics as a discipline would not meet the basic requirements of the natural sciences. See, for example, 
Philip Mirowski, “Physics and the ‘Marginalist Revolution’,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 8 (1984), 
pp. 361-79; E. Roy Weintraub, “How Should We Write the History of Twentieth Century Economics?” 
Oxford Review of Political Economy, vol. 15 (Winter 1999),  pp. 139-152; and E. Roy Weintraub, How 
Economics Became a Mathematical Science (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).  
 
14MacIntyre’s definition of a practice is: “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers are to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved are systematically extended” (After Virtue (Notre Dame Indiana, Notre Dame University 
Press, 1984, p. 187). 
 
15 Lawrence E. Cahoone. The Ends of Philosophy: Pragmatism, Foundationalism, and Postmodernism (New 
York: State University Press, 1995). 
 
16 It has been suggested that Sartre’s essay “Existentialism as a Humanism” is an example of refined public 
philosophy. I think this is correct even if the text were edited for publication after it was originally given. 
Nonetheless, this counter example illustrates that the rhetoric and method of public philosophy will vary from 
culture to culture, and more “intellectual” or more “philosophically capable” societies will have a higher 
tolerance for and better understanding of more technical public philosophy.  
 
17 For a general defense of the public humanities, see “The Humanities in America: The Case for Public 
Funding” Why? Philosophical Discussions About Everyday Life, episode 14, March 14, 2010. 
 
18 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indiana: Liberty Classics, 1982), VI.ii.1.1. 
 
19 For Adam Smith’s philosophy of education and a discussion of the development of moral and intellectual 
capacities, see Weinstein, Adam Smith’s Pluralism, especially chapters three and four. 
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20 See: Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” The Proper Study of Mankind (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 1998): 191—242 and Charles Taylor "What's Wrong With Negative Liberty?”, Philosophy and 
the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 211-29. 
 
21 Charles Flinn Arrowood claims that “Smith’s political doctrines reflect a thoroughly naive and inadequate 
theory of the nature of mind and of knowledge.” He repeatedly asserts that Smith saw people as “complete in 
all their faculties apart from the operation of any social forces” (Theory of Education in the Political 
Philosophy of Adam Smith (Privately printed, 1945), pp. 10, 13, 13. Both of these statements are patently false. 
See also Weinstein, Adam Smith’s Pluralism, pp. 170-171).   
 
22 Weinstein, Adam Smith’s Pluralism, pp. 147-154, 210-215.  
 
23 The phrase “the necessities of participation” is mine and will prove central to a work currently in progress. I 
first use it publicly in “Forcing the Iraqis to be Free: Comments on the Question: “Can Democracy be Imposed 
by an External Military Force?” a panel discussion on March 8, 2007 at the University of North Dakota. The 
full text is available at http://philpapers.org/rec/WEIFTI or 
http://www.und.nodak.edu/instruct/weinstei/jrweinstein%20-%20forcing%20iraqis%20to%20be%20free.pdf  
 
24 My claim in this essay is not that all people are philosophical from birth; some are better at philosophy than 
others and some, no doubt, are just uninterested. My assertion instead is that it is possible for non-philosophers 
to be non-academically philosophical and that such inquiries also count as philosophy. As such, the 
democratic participation of all people, philosophical or not, is the issue here. 
 
25  On the public policy level, the age of reason is not actually sufficient. Gender, age, race, ethnicity, 
citizenship, literacy, and wealth have been all historical impediments to universal participation. These are, 
however, cultural variations, unjust or not, and, as such, the philosophical purpose of the age of reason is to 
denote the moment of moral and political competence. 
 
26 This practice has come to be known as “greenwashing.” See for example: Joshua Karliner "A Brief History 
of Greenwash", CorpWatch, March 22, 2001. (Available at: http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=243). 
 
27 Aliyah Shabid, “Majority of 2012 Republican primary voters are birthers, do not believe Obama born in 
U.S.: poll,” New York Daily News, February 16, 20011. Available at:  
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-02-16/news/28622364_1_birther-movement-public-policy-polling-
survey-ppp-poll 
 
28 While Rove insists that the President was indeed born in the United States, he falsely suggests that the 
persistence of this particular conspiracy theory is a “white house trap” intended to delegitimize the Republican 
Party. Interview Fox News, February 16, 2011. See: http://gop12.thehill.com/2011/02/rove-confront-birthers-
now.html 
 
29 A Spanish proverb tells it this way: “If three people say you are an ass, put on a bridle.” 
 
30 Weinstein, “Philosophy and its Public,” p. 5. 
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31 As the abstract of one recent study puts it: “The familiar image of rational electoral choice has voters 
weighing the competing candidates’ strengths and weaknesses, calculating comparative distances in issue 
space, and assessing the president’s management of foreign affairs and the national economy. Indeed, once or 
twice in a lifetime, a national or personal crisis does induce political thought. But most of the time, the voters 
adopt issue positions, adjust their candidate perceptions, and invent facts to rationalize decisions they have 
already made. The implications of this distinction—between genuine thinking and its day-to-day counterfeit—
strike at the roots of both positive and normative theories of electoral democracy.” (Christopher H. Achen and 
Larry M. Bartels “It Feels Like We’re Thinking: The Rationalizing: Voter and Electoral Democracy,” 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 30-
September 3, 2006. 
 
32 For a full-length introduction to a unified account of Smith, see: Jack Russell Weinstein, On Adam Smith 
(Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2001). 
 
33 For an overview of the research suggesting that rational argument reinforces political belief rather than 
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